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1
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes how the recent empirical patterns of international capital flows may
affect production efficiency in a two-country overlapping-generations model. According
to the standard neoclassical macroeconomic theory, capital should flow “downhill” from
the rich country where the marginal return on capital is low to the poor country where
the marginal return on capital is high, which would make the world output higher than
under international financial autarky. Meanwhile, there would be no difference between
gross and net capital flows because capital flows would be unidirectional.
The recent empirical patterns of international capital flows are in stark contrast to
these predictions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2006, 2007). First, capital in the net
term flows “uphill” from poor to rich countries (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006,
2007). Second, financial capital flows from poor to rich countries, while foreign direct
investment (hereafter, FDI) flows in the opposite direction (Ju and Wei, 2007). Third,
despite of its negative net positions of international investment since 1986, the U.S. has
been receiving a positive net investment income until 2005 (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007;
Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2007; Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille, 2007). According to
neoclassical models, the recent pattern of “uphill” net capital flows tends to reduce the
world output. However, in order to evaluate its efficiency effects, we need a model having
the theoretical predictions in line with the current patterns of capital flows.
Recent research offers two main explanations to these empirical facts. Devereux and
Sutherland (2009) and Tille and van Wincoop (2008a,b) focus on the risk-sharing that
investors can achieve by diversifying investment globally. International portfolio invest-
ment is determined by the cross-correlation patterns of aggregate shocks hitting individual
economies. These models do not distinguish between FDI and portfolio investment.
The second strand of literature emphasizes the implications of domestic financial mar-
ket imperfections on the patterns of international capital flows (Antras and Caballero,
2009; Antras, Desai, and Foley, 2009; Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2009a,b; Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008; Mendoza, Quadrini, and R´ıos-Rull, 2009; Smith and Valder-
rama, 2008). Matsuyama (2004) shows that in the presence of domestic credit market
imperfections, financial market globalization may lead to a steady-state equilibrium in
which fundamentally identical countries end up with different levels of output per capita,
a result he calls “symmetry breaking”. In the steady state, capital flows “uphill” from the
poor to the rich country. Given the concave production function on the country level, the
world output is lower than under international financial autarky. Ju and Wei (2007, 2008)
analyze how the cross-country differences in various institutional aspects jointly generate
the two-way flows of financial capital and FDI. The distinction between FDI and portfolio
investment plays a key role in their models.
von Hagen and Zhang (2010) follow the second strand of the literature and prove ana-
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lytically that the cross-country difference in financial development is sufficient to explain
the three recent empirical facts. Intuitively, individuals differ in productivity and the
credit markets channel savings from those with low to those with high productivity. If
the credit market were perfect, production would be efficiently conducted by the most
productive individuals and the rates of return on loans and equity capital would be equal
to the social rate of return. However, due to domestic financial frictions, the most pro-
ductive individuals are subject to borrowing constraints. The constraint on the aggregate
credit demand keeps the rate of return on loan, i.e., the loan rate, inefficiently lower while
the rate of return to equity capital, i.e., the equity rate, higher than social rate of return.
Thus, financial frictions distort the two interest rates. Under full capital mobility, since
the more financially developed country has a larger credit market, it receives net capital
inflows and becomes richer. Thus, in the steady state, net capital flows are “uphill” from
the poor to the rich country. Since the loan rate is lower while the equity rate is higher
in the less financially developed country under international financial autarky, financial
capital flows from the poor to the rich country while FDI flows in the opposite direction.
Since the rich country receives a higher return on its foreign assets than it pays for its
foreign liabilities, it receives a positive net investment income despite of its negative net
position of international investment. Thus, von Hagen and Zhang (2010) generates the
theoretical predictions in line with the three recent empirical facts.
For the tractability purpose, von Hagen and Zhang (2010) assume that only some
individuals are endowed with the productive projects while others just lend all the savings
inelastically to them. The loan rate adjusts to clear the credit market and the total
savings are entirely invested by the most productive individuals. Thus, financial frictions
in the model of von Hagen and Zhang (2010) do not distort production efficiency under
international financial autarky. Under capital mobility, net capital flows widen the cross-
country output gap so that the world output is lower than under international financial
autarky. The world output losses in Matsuyama (2004) are caused by the same reason.
This result can be explained intuitively by the theory of second best. Given that domestic
financial frictions distort the two interest rates, capital mobility causes financial capital
(FDI) flowing to the country where the loan rate (the equity rate) is higher rather than
to the country where the marginal product of capital is higher. Thus, in the presence of
domestic financial frictions, factor mobility may not increase the world output.
As widely documented in the empirical literature (Barlevy, 2003; Hsieh and Klenow,
2009; Jeong and Townsend, 2007; Levine, 1997; Midrigan and Xu, 2009), financial frictions
also distort production efficiency in the sense that some resources are inefficiently allocated
into the less productive projects. If this distortion is not considered in the model, the
efficiency analysis of international capital flows will be incomplete and misleading.
In this paper, we extend the models of Matsuyama (2004) and von Hagen and Zhang
(2010) by assuming that all individuals can produce, but they differ in productivity. As
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a result, financial frictions create two distinct distortions on the interest rates and on
production efficiency under international financial autarky. Under capital mobility, the
cross-country interest rate differential drives international capital flows. In equilibrium,
the interest rates in the less financially developed country converge towards their respec-
tive efficient levels. Meanwhile, capital flows trigger the capital reallocation both across
and within the border from the less to the more productive individuals. This way, inter-
national capital flows mitigate the two distinct distortions of financial frictions.
Similar as von Hagen and Zhang (2010), this model generates the patterns of capital
flows qualitatively in line with the recent empirical facts mentioned above. Then, we use
the model to analyze how such patterns affect the world output. As mentioned above,
“uphill” net capital flows widen the cross-country output gap and tend to reduce the
world output, while FDI and financial capital flows improve production efficiency in the
less financially developed country, which tends to raise the world output. The first effect
depends on net capital flows, while the second effect depends on gross capital flows.
Under full capital mobility, two-way capital flows imply large gross flows and small net
flows, which strengthens the second effect and weakens the first effect, respectively. Thus,
the world output is higher. While, if the mobility of either FDI or financial capital is
restricted, net flows and gross flows are same. Thus, the second effect may not be strong
enough to dominate the first one and capital mobility may reduce the world output. In the
net shell, capital reallocation within and across the border is the key mechanism behind
the output effect on the country and world level.
We also analyze how capital mobility affects the convergence process of a developing
country. We show that full capital mobility speeds up capital accumulation in the early
stage of its convergence process at the cost of lower output in the long run.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model
under international financial autarky and discusses how domestic financial frictions may
distort the interest rates and production efficiency. Section 3 analyzes how the cross-
country difference in financial development may drive the patterns of capital flows and
affect the world production efficiency. Section 4 concludes with the main findings. The
appendix collects proofs and other related issues.
2 The Model under International Financial Autarky
2.1 The Model Setting
We use an overlapping-generations model closely related to Matsuyama (2004) and von
Hagen and Zhang (2010). The world economy consists of two countries, Home (H) and
Foreign (F). There are two types of goods, a final good, which is internationally tradable
and serves as the numeraire, and a capital good, which is not traded internationally. The
price of the capital good in country i ∈ {H,F} and period t is denoted by vit. The final
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good can be either consumed or transformed into capital goods. At the beginning of
each period, final goods Y it are produced with capital goods K
i
t and labor L
i
t in a Cobb-
Douglas fashion. Capital goods fully depreciate after production. Capital goods and labor
are priced at their respective marginal products in terms of final goods. To summarize,
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
Lit
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
vitK
i
t = αY
i
t and w
i
tL
i
t = (1− α)Y it . (2)
There is no uncertainty in the economy. In this section, we assume that capital flows are
not allowed between the two countries.
In both countries, the population consists of two generations, the old and the young,
which live for two periods each. There is no population growth and the population size
of each generation in each country is normalized to one. Agents consume only when old.
Young agents are endowed with a unit of labor which they supply inelastically to the
production of final goods Lit = 1 at the wage rate w
i
t in period t.
Each generation consists of two types of agents of mass η and 1−η, respectively, which
we call entrepreneurs and households. They are endowed with productive projects and it
takes one period to produce capital goods using final goods. By assumption, the project
of entrepreneurs has a higher marginal product than that of households. In equilibrium,
entrepreneurs prefer to borrow from households to finance their investment.
Consider any particular household born in period t and country i. The household
invests ii,ht in his project, and lends the rest of his labor income, d
i
t = w
i
t− ii,ht , at the gross
interest rate of rit. In period t + 1, he receives the deposit returns, r
i
td
i
t, and his project
produces G(ii,ht ) units of capital goods. As summarized in Assumption 1, the household
project is strictly concave with an upper bound of R on the marginal product,
Assumption 1. G(ii,ht ) > 0, G
′(ii,ht ) > 0, G
′′(ii,ht ) < 0, ∀ ii,ht > 0; G(0) = 0, G′(0) = R.
In period t, the household chooses ii,ht to maximize his consumption when old,
ci,ht+1 = r
i
t(w
i
t − ii,ht ) + vit+1G(ii,ht ). (3)
In equilibrium, he is indifferent between lending and investing in his own project,
rit = v
i
t+1G
′(ii,ht ). (4)
Consider any particular entrepreneur born in period t and country i. The entrepreneur
invests ii,et units of final goods in the project which produces Ri
i,e
t units of capital goods
in period t + 1. Assumption 1 ensures that the entrepreneurial project is always more
productive than the household project. The entrepreneur finances his investment ii,et using
the loan zit = i
i,e
t − wit and the equity capital, wit. Due to limited commitment problems,
however, his debt repayment cannot exceed a fraction of his project revenues,
ritz
i
t = r
i
t(i
i,e
t − wit) ≤ θiRii,et vit+1, where θi ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
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As in Matsuyama (2004, 2007), the level of financial development in country i is measured
by θi ∈ [0, 1], which is higher in countries with more sophisticated financial and legal
systems, better creditor protection, and more liquid asset market. Thus, θi captures a
wide range of institutional factors.1 We assume that country H and country F differ only
in the level of financial development, 0 ≤ θH < θF ≤ 1.
After repaying the debt in period t + 1, the entrepreneur receives Rii,et v
i
t+1 − ritzit as
the return on equity capital. The equity rate is the rate of return on equity capital,
Γit ≡
Rii,et v
i
t+1 − ritzit
wit
= Rvit+1 + (Rv
i
t+1 − rit)(λit − 1) ≥ rit, (6)
where λit ≡ i
i,e
t
wit
denotes the investment-equity ratio. For each unit of the equity capital
invested in the project, the entrepreneur gets Rvit+1 as the marginal return. In addition, he
can borrow (λit−1) units of debt which provides him an extra rate of return, (Rvit+1−rit).
The term, (Rvit+1 − rit)(λit − 1), captures the leverage effect, which can be decomposed
into two parts, the debt-equity ratio (λit− 1) and the spread, (Rvit+1− rit). In equilibrium,
the equity rate should be no less than the loan rate; otherwise, the entrepreneur would
rather lend than borrow. The inequality in (6) is equivalent to rit ≤ Rvit+1 and we call it
the participation constraint for the entrepreneur.
If rit < Rv
i
t+1, the entrepreneur borrows to the limit, i.e., he finances the investment
ii,et using
θivt+1Ri
i,e
t
rit
units of loan and wit units of equity capital in period t. After repaying
the debt in period t + 1, the entrepreneur gets (1 − θi)vt+1Rii,et as the project return. If
rit = Rv
i
t+1, the entrepreneur does not borrow to the limit. According to equation (6), the
equity rate is equal to the loan rate, Γit = r
i
t. To summarize,
Γit =

(1−θi)Rvit+1ii,et
wit
=
(1−θi)Rvit+1
1− θ
iRvit+1
rit
, if rit < Rv
i
t+1,
Rvit+1 if r
i
t = Rv
i
t+1.
(7)
The entrepreneur chooses his investment ii,et to maximize his consumption when old,
ci,et+1 = v
i
t+1Ri
i,e
t − ritzit = witΓit, (8)
subject to the borrowing constraint (5) and the participation constraint (6). Note that
only one of the two constraints can be strictly binding in equilibrium.
Aggregate capital goods available for aggregate production in period t+ 1 is
Kit+1 = ηRi
i,e
t + (1− η)G(ii,ht ). (9)
1The pledgeability, θi, can be argued in various forms of agency costs (Hart and Moore, 1994; Holm-
strom and Tirole, 1997; Townsend, 1979). The strictness of the borrowing constraint may also depend
on idiosyncratic features of entrepreneurs and their projects, e.g., the credit records, the availability of
collateral assets, the project rating, etc. Since we focus here on the aggregate implications of financial
development, we assume that the entrepreneurial projects invested in country i are homogeneous and
subject to the same θi for simplicity.
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The credit market and the final goods market clear in equilibrium,
ηzit = (1− η)dit or η(ii,et − wit) = (1− η)(wit − ii,ht ), (10)
Cit + I
i
t = Y
i
t , (11)
where Cit ≡ ηci,et +(1−η)ci,ht and I it ≡ ηii,et +(1−η)ii,ht denote aggregate consumption and
aggregate investment in country i and period t. As the household project is less productive
than the entrepreneurial project, aggregate production is efficient when investment is
entirely conducted by entrepreneurs. We measure production inefficiency by
(1−η)ii,ht
Iit
.
Definition 1. Given the level of financial development θi, the market equilibrium in coun-
try i ∈ {H,F} under international financial autarky is a set of allocations of households,
{ii,ht , ci,ht }, entrepreneurs, {ii,et , ci,et }, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , wit, vit, rit,Γit}, satis-
fying equations (1)-(5), (7)-(10),
Under international financial autarky, young individuals invest their labor income in
the production of capital goods, I it = w
i
t = (1 − α)Y it . The social rate of return to the
aggregate investment is defined as the ratio of the aggregate project revenue in period
t+1 over the aggregate investment in period t, Ψit ≡ v
i
t+1K
i
t+1
wit
=
αY it+1
(1−α)Y it , which is constant
in the steady state at Ψi = ρ ≡ α
1−α .
Given the size of the working population normalized at one, the capital-labor ratio
coincides with the aggregate capital stock, Kit . For simplicity, we use K
i
t to denote the
capital-labor ratio, too. According to equations (1) and (2), the wage rate wit =
(
Kit
ρ
)α
is uniquely determined by the capital-labor ratio. According to equation (9), the capital-
labor ratio in period t is determined in period t − 1 by the size and the distribution of
the aggregate investment among entrepreneurs and households.
2.2 Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability of The Steady State
We show the existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state under international
financial autarky by analyzing the phase diagram of wages. For simplicity, we drop the
country superscripts in the following analysis.
Proposition 1. Let θ¯ ≡ 1 − η. For θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], aggregate production is efficient, iht = 0;
the economic allocation is independent of θ and identical as in the case of θ = θ¯.
Proof. See appendix A.
In the case of θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], the aggregate labor income in period t is entirely invested into
the entrepreneurial projects, It = ηi
e
t = wt, and, thus, aggregate capital goods available
for production in period t + 1 is Kt+1 = Rηi
e
t = Rwt. The model dynamics can be
characterized by a first-order difference equation on the wage dynamics,
wt+1 = (1− α)Yt+1 =
(
Rwt
ρ
)α
. (12)
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Given α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of wages is concave and starts from the origin. Its
slope, dwt+1
dwt
= α
(
R
ρ
)α
(wt)
α−1, converges to +∞ for wt → 0 and to 0 for wt → +∞.
Thus, there exists a unique and stable non-zero steady state with the wage at
wIFA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
, (13)
where the subscript IFA denotes the steady-state value of a variable under international
financial autarky. According to equations (12) and (13), the wage dynamics are indepen-
dent of θ and the wage converges globally and monotonically to the steady-state value
wIFA, same in the two countries. So do aggregate output and the capital-labor ratio.
Proposition 2. For θ ∈ [0, θ¯), some resources are inefficiently allocated into the house-
hold projects, iht > 0. Given the capital-labor ratio, financial development facilitates
resource reallocation from the less to the more productive projects,
∂iht
∂θ
< 0 <
∂iet
∂θ
, and the
improvement in production efficiency raises the wage in the next period, ∂wt+1
∂θ
> 0.
Proof. See appendix A.
w
t
w
t+1
0
AM
N
θ≥θU
B
θ=0.5θU
D
θ=0
Figure 1: The Phase Diagram of Wages
Figure 1 shows the phase diagrams of wages in three cases, θ ∈ {0, 0.5θU , θU}, where
θU ≡ θ¯. For the illustrative purpose, consider the case where the credit market is inactive
(θ = 0) and the economy is in the steady state (point D) before period t = 0. From
period t = 0 on, the credit market is fully developed with θ ≥ θ¯ and thus, entrepreneurs
are not credit-constrained. In period t = 0, the investment in the household project falls
to zero and the aggregate labor income is fully invested in the entrepreneurial project in
period t = 0. DN measures the short-run efficiency gains in terms of the rise in the labor
income in period t = 1. From period t = 1 on, the wage converges to the new steady state
(point A) and NM measures the long-run efficiency gains due to capital accumulation.
Figure 1 also shows that there exists a unique and stable steady state if the borrowing
constraints are binding, θ ∈ [0, θ¯).
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2.3 Decomposition of The Two Interest Rates
The interest rate patterns with respect to financial development deserve special attention,
because the cross-country interest rate differentials essentially drive capital flows in section
3. In this subsection, we identify the various channels through which financial development
may affect the two interest rates under international financial autarky.
Proposition 3. For θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], the borrowing constraints are not binding and two interest
rates are equal to the social rate of return, rt = Γt = Ψt = Rvt+1 = R
αρ1−α
2
(Kt)
α(α−1).
Proof. See appendix A.
According to equation (1), the neoclassical aggregate production function is concave
in the capital-labor ratio, Kt. The marginal rate of return to investment Rvt+1 declines
with Kt and so does the social rate of return, which we call the neoclassical effect. For
θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], the two interest rates are equal to the social rate of return, independent of θ.
Proposition 4. For θ ∈ [0, θ¯), the borrowing constraints are binding and the loan rate is
lower while the equity rate is higher than the social rate of return, rt < Ψt < Rvt+1 ≤ Γt.
Proof. See appendix A.
Given θ ∈ [0, θ¯), we first analyze how financial development measured by a marginal
increase in θ affects the loan rate. Combining equations (5) and (10), the loan rate is,
rt = Rvt+1
θ
(1− η)
[
ηwt
(1− η)(wt − iht )
+ 1
]
(1− η).
Besides the neoclassical effect Rvt+1, the loan rate is also affected by the financial-
development effect θ
1−η , and the credit-supply effect, (1− η)(wt − iht ).
The aggregate credit demand, Dt = η
θRvt+1iet
rt
, declines with the loan rate and the curve
is downward sloping. According to equation (4), given a rise in the loan rate, households
reduce the project investment,
∂iht
∂rt
< 0, and raise their lending. Thus, the aggregate credit
supply, St = (1− η)(wt − iht ), rises in the loan rate and the curve is upward sloping.
Figure 2 illustrates how the credit market equilibrium responds immediately to a
marginal increase in the level of financial development from θA to θB in period t, where
0 ≤ θA < θB < θ¯. Given wt and θA, the aggregate credit demand curve and the aggregate
credit supply curve jointly determine the credit market equilibrium at point A. With a
marginal increase in θ, entrepreneurs can borrow against a larger fraction of the project
revenues and the aggregate credit demand curve shifts to the right. It tends to raise
the loan rate and is captured by the financial-development effect. At the same time, the
resource reallocation from households to entrepreneurs improves production efficiency and
the aggregate output of capital goods in period t+1 increases. The decline in the price of
capital goods in period t+ 1 has a negative impact on the loan rate, which is captured by
9
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Figure 2: Immediate Impacts of Financial Development on the Loan Rate
the neoclassical effect. The decline in the price of capital goods also induces households
to reduce the project investment and the aggregate credit supply curve shifts to the right.
It tends to reduce the loan rate and is captured by the credit-supply effect. Overall, given
the labor income, an increase in θ shifts the equilibrium from point A to point B2 and the
net impact on the loan rate in period t depends on the relative size of the three effects.
For θ = 0, aggregate production is least efficient in the sense that households invest
all the labor income in their own projects and the marginal productivity differential is
largest, R−G′(iht ). A marginal increase in θ generates large short-run efficiency gains and
the price of capital goods in period t+ 1 declines significantly. As a result, both the neo-
classical effect and the credit-supply effect are strong, which partially offsets the financial-
development effect. In the net term, the loan rate rises slightly with θ. In contrast, for θ
close to θ¯, the household project investment is small and so is the marginal productivity
differential. A marginal increase in θ only generates small efficiency gains and the price
of capital goods declines slightly in period t+ 1. As a result, both the neoclassical effect
and the credit-supply effect are weak, which is dominated by the financial-development
effect. In the net term, the loan rate rises significantly with θ.
Proposition 5. Given the capital-labor ratio, the loan rate has the highest value at θ = θ¯.
Proof. See appendix A.
Proposition 5 confirms that the loan rate pattern is upward sloping near the upper
bound of θ = θ¯. Overall, the loan rate has a non-linear pattern with respect to θ ∈ [0, θ¯],
due to the endogenous credit supply. Be specific, it is rather flat near the lower bound of
θ = 0 but strictly upward sloping near the upper bound of θ = θ¯.
Up to now, we focus on the immediate impact of financial development on the loan
rate in period t, given the capital-labor ratio. As shown in figure 1, an increase in
2Figure 2 is only for the illustrative purpose. Exact changes in the supply and demand curves are
more complicated, e.g., the neoclassical effect may further shift credit demand and supply curves. We
only show the equilibria before and after the change for simplicity.
10
θ immediately generates the short-run efficiency gains and then, capital accumulation
generates the long-run efficiency gains over time. Thus, besides its immediate impacts
via the three effects mentioned above, financial development affects the loan rate in the
long run indirectly through capital accumulation.
Proposition 6. For θ ∈ (0, θ¯), the labor income has a positive and less-than-proportional
effect on the household project investment, 0 <
∂iht
∂wt
<
iht
wt
.
Proof. See appendix A.
A marginal increase in θ in period t improves production efficiency and the labor
income in period t + 1 is higher. According to Proposition 6, households invest the
extra labor income less-than-proportional into their own projects but lend more-than-
proportional to the credit market in period t+ 1. This way, capital accumulation further
strengthens resource reallocation and improves production efficiency over time. Due to
the enhanced neoclassical effect, the loan rate tends to be lower in the long run.
For a smaller initial value of θ, a marginal increase in θ generates a stronger short-run
efficiency gains and so are the long-run efficiency gains due to capital accumulation. Thus,
the long-run pattern of the loan rate becomes flatter or even downward sloping near the
lower bound of θ = 0. Since the social rate of return is constant at Ψ = ρ in the long run,
the loan rate pattern is steeper near the upper end of θ = θ¯ than its short-run pattern,
depending on the functional form of the household project.
For θ ∈ [0, θ¯), let us analyze how financial development may affect the equity rate.
Combining equations (6) and (10), we reformulate the equity rate as
Γt = Rvt+1 + (Rvt+1 − rt)(λt − 1), where λt − 1 = 1− η
η
(
1− i
h
t
wt
)
. (14)
Financial development has an immediate impact on the equity rate in period t through
three channels. First, the improvement in production efficiency leads to the decline in
the price of capital goods in period t + 1. It tends to reduce the equity rate and is
captured by the neoclassical effect Rvt+1. Second, the decline in the price of capital goods
induces households to lend more to the credit market. It raises the debt-equity ratio
(λt−1) and tends to raise the equity rate. Third, the decline in the project investment of
households reduces the marginal product differential. It reduces the spread, vt+1R− rt =
vt+1[R − G′(iht )] and tends to reduce the equity rate. The net impact depends on the
relative size of the three effects.
Given the capital-labor ratio, production is least efficient at θ = 0 in the sense that
the marginal product differential is largest, R−G′(wt) and so is the spread (Rvt+1−rt) =
vt+1[R − G′(wt)]. For a marginal increase in θ at the lower bound of θ = 0, the credit-
supply effect is strong and so is the rise in the debt-equity ratio. It dominates the declines
in the price of capital goods and the spread. Thus, the equity rate rises with θ. For θ close
to θ¯, the household project investment is small. Given a marginal increase in θ, resource
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reallocation is small and so is the rise in the debt-equity ratio. The declines in the spread
and in the price of capital goods dominate. Thus, the equity rate declines with θ.
Proposition 7. Given the capital-labor ratio, the equity rate has the lowest value at θ = θ¯.
Proof. See appendix A.
Proposition 7 confirms that the equity rate pattern is downward sloping near the
upper bound of θ = θ¯. Overall, the equity rate has a hump-shaped pattern with respect
to θ ∈ [0, θ¯], mainly due to the flat pattern of the loan rate at the lower bound of θ.
Financial development also affects the equity rate in the long run via capital accumu-
lation and the hump-shaped pattern of the equity rate is reinforced.
2.4 Parameterization
Introducing the concave household project into the analytical framework of von Hagen and
Zhang (2010) makes the model less tractable. Since we focus here more on the qualitative
results, a numerical example is used to show the intuition explicitly.
We set η = 0.2 and R = 1 implying that entrepreneurs account for 20% of the popula-
tion and produce capital goods one-to-one from final goods. According to Proposition 1,
θ¯ = 1− η = 0.8. The household project has a linear-quadratic form, G(iht ) = Riht − (i
h
t )
2
2
,
where G′(iht ) = R − iht > 0, G′′(iht ) = −1 < 0, for iht ∈ (0, R). The functional form of
household project and the values of α, R and η do not matter for our qualitative results.
In the standard neoclassical growth model, the capital share has a conventional value
around α = 1
3
. If so, our model economy under international financial autarky becomes
dynamically inefficient in the sense that the social rate of return is smaller than one in
the steady state, Ψ = α
1−α < 1. Thus, we have to set α > 0.5 to ensure Ψ > 1 in
our model. Alternatively, we may assume the preference of an agent born in period t
as U(cyt , c
o
t+1) = ln c
y
t + β ln c
o
t+1, where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor, cyt
and cot+1 denote his consumption when young and when old. In this case, even if we set
α = 1
3
, the economy is still dynamically efficient Ψ = α
1−α
1+β
β
> 1. Under the alternative
assumption, our results and the key mechanisms still hold but the analysis becomes more
complicated. For simplicity, we set α = 0.6 so that Ψ = 1.5.
2.5 Steady-State Patterns of Endogenous Variables
Figure 3 shows the steady-state patterns of endogenous variables with respect to the level
of financial development θ ∈ [0, 1] denoted by the horizontal axis.
For θ ∈ [0, θ¯), the constraint on the aggregate credit demand keeps the loan rate
inefficiently lower and the equity rate inefficiently higher than the marginal return on
the entrepreneurial project. Due to the depressed loan rate, the less productive projects
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Figure 3: The Steady-State Patterns under International Financial Autarky
are financed in equilibrium and aggregate production is inefficient. This way, financial
underdevelopment distorts the two interest rates and production efficiency.
Financial development measured by an increase in θ enables entrepreneurs to borrow
against a larger fraction of their project revenue. As shown in the first and second panels,
such an increase in the aggregate credit demand leads to the resource reallocation from
households to entrepreneurs and aggregate production becomes more efficient. The decline
in the price of capital goods induces households to reduce their project investment and
raise lending. This way, financial development affects the aggregate credit demand and
supply. As discussed in subsection 2.3, the net effect on the two interest rates depends
on the initial level of θ. Be specific, the steady-state pattern of the loan rate is rather
flat near the lower bound of θ = 0 but steep near the upper bound of θ = θ¯, with the
highest value at the threshold of θ¯; the equity rate has a hump-shaped pattern with the
lowest value at the threshold of θ¯. Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the
social return on investment in the steady state is constant at Ψ = vK
I
= αY
(1−α)Y = ρ and
independent of θ. See the third panel.
For θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], the aggregate credit demand is large enough to raise the loan rate equal
to the marginal return on the entrepreneurial project. In this case, households do not
invest in their own project and capital goods are produced entirely by entrepreneurs.
Thus, aggregate production is efficient and an increase in θ does not affect the allocation.
3 International Capital Flows
We consider three scenarios of capital mobility, free mobility of FDI under which en-
trepreneurs are allowed to make direct investment abroad3 but individuals are not allowed
to lend abroad, free mobility of financial capital under which individuals are allowed to
lend abroad but entrepreneurs are not allowed to make direct investment abroad, and full
capital mobility under which individuals are allowed to lend abroad and entrepreneurs are
3Entrepreneurs can either bring their funds and projects abroad for investment or make equity in-
vestment in the foreign entrepreneurial project. The two alternatives are analytically equivalent in our
model. Without the necessary skills, households cannot make direct or equity investment abroad.
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allowed to make direct investments abroad.
We assume that country F is financially developed, θF = θ¯, while country H is not,
θH ∈ [0, θ¯). As shown in appendix C, this assumption guarantees that the borrowing
constraints are strictly binding in the steady state in both countries under capital mobility,
endogenous variables are continuous and differentiable in θH ∈ [0, θ¯) in the steady state.
In subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we assume that both countries are initially in the
steady state under international financial autarky before capital mobility is allowed from
period t = 0 on. We analyze the short-run and the long-run impacts of capital mobility.4
In subsection 3.4, we analyze a more general and realistic case of capital flows between
developed and developing countries. Be specific, we assume that country F is initially in
the steady state while country H below its steady state before capital mobility from period
t = 0 on. We discuss how the patterns of capital flows may change along the convergence
process of a developing country, i.e., country H, and how capital mobility may affect its
aggregate investment and output along the convergence process.
Let Υit and Ω
i
t denote aggregate outflows of financial capital and equity capital (FDI)
from country i in period t, respectively, with negative values indicating capital inflows.
Financial capital flows affect the domestic credit supply, (1− η)(wit − ii,ht )−Υit. Through
affecting the aggregate equity capital for the domestic investment, ηwit − Ωit, FDI flows
increase the aggregate credit demand in the host country and reduce that in the parent
country.5 With these changes, the analysis in section 2 carries through, due to the linearity
of the preferences, the productive projects, and the borrowing constraints.
Given our parameter values, it can be shown that there exists a unique and stable
non-zero steady state under the three scenarios of capital mobility.
3.1 Free Mobility of FDI
Given that the borrowing constraints are binding in country i, the investment-equity
ratio and the debt-equity ratio of the entrepreneurial project are λit =
1
1− θ
i
tRv
i
t+1
rit
and
λit − 1, respectively. Under free mobility of FDI, the aggregate output of capital goods
produced by entrepreneurs in country i, Rλit(ηw
i
t−Ωit), and the aggregate credit demand,
(λit−1)(ηwit−Ωit), are linear in the aggregate equity capital invested in country i, (ηwit−Ωit).
4Given the model structure of overlapping generations, capital mobility from period t = 0 on does not
affect the behaviors of individuals born before period t = 0, even if announced in advance.
5In the case of debt default, the project liquidation value depends on the efficiency of the legal
institution, the law enforcement, and the asset market in the host country. Thus, we assume that
entrepreneurs making FDI borrow only from the host country and are subject to the borrowing constraints
there. Alternatively, we can assume that entrepreneurs borrow only in their parent country no matter
where they invest, because the financial institutions in their parent country have better information on
their credit record, social network, and business activities. The realistic case should be a hybrid of the
two. Our results hold under the alternative assumption.
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The equilibrium conditions under free mobility of FDI are almost same as under in-
ternational financial autarky except for a few conditions. In equilibrium, the cross-border
flows of FDI sum up to zero; the equity rate is equal across the border; the credit-market-
clearing condition and the aggregate output of capital goods in country i are specified by
equations (16) and (17), respectively,
ΩHt + Ω
F
t = 0, and Γ
H
t = Γ
F
t = Γ
∗
t , (15)
(λit − 1)(ηwit − Ωit) = (1− η)(wit − ii,ht ), (16)
Kit+1 = Rλ
i
t(ηw
i
t − Ωit) + (1− η)G(ii,ht ). (17)
In subsection 3.1.1, we analyze the model dynamics with respect to free mobility of FDI
from period t = 0 on, given θH = θ¯
2
and θF = θ¯. In subsection 3.1.2, we analyze the
long-run impacts of free mobility of FDI, given θH ∈ [0, θ¯) and θF = θ¯.
3.1.1 Dynamic Impacts of Free Mobility of FDI
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of variables in terms of the percentage deviations
from their steady-state values under international financial autarky, with the horizon-
tal axis denoting the time periods. The vertical axes of panels entitled “Capital Flows
(Level)” and “Country Output (Level)” show the levels of relevant variables.
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Figure 4: From International Financial Autarky to Free Mobility of FDI
According to figure 3, the steady-state equity rate is higher in country H than in
country F under international financial autarky. Thus, from period t = 0 on, entrepreneurs
born in country F make direct investment in country H. The cross-country equity rate
equalization implies that the equity rate declines (rises) in country H (F).
Consider country F first. FDI outflows reduce the aggregate domestic investment.
The decline in the aggregate output of capital goods raises the price of capital goods in
period t = 1. Meanwhile, FDI outflows reduce the aggregate domestic equity capital and
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the aggregate credit demand declines in period t = 0. The rise in the price of capital
goods and the decline in the aggregate credit demand induce households to lend less and
start to invest in their own projects in period t = 0. Thus, FDI outflows reduce aggregate
output in period t = 1 directly via the size and indirectly via the composition of the
aggregate domestic investment in period t = 0. Since the decline in the aggregate credit
demand dominates that in the aggregate credit supply, the loan rate falls in period t = 0.
Consider country H then. Similar as the analysis for country F, FDI inflows (ΩHt <
0) raise aggregate output in period t = 1 directly via the size and indirectly via the
composition of the aggregate domestic investment in period t = 0.
Combining equations (5) and (16), the loan rate is reformulated as
rHt = Rv
H
t+1
θH
(1− η)
[
ηwHt − ΩHt
(1− η)(wHt − iH,ht )
+ 1
]
(1− η). (18)
Given θH and the financial-development effect θ
H
(1−η) , the loan rate is affected by the
neoclassical effect RvHt+1, the credit-supply effect (1−η)(wHt −iH,ht ), and the credit-demand
effect measured by the aggregate equity capital ηwHt −ΩHt . The net impact of FDI inflows
depends on the relative size of the three components, which eventually depends on θH .
For θH close to zero, iH,ht is large before period t = 0 and so is the productivity
differential between the entrepreneurial and the household projects. FDI inflows strongly
improve production efficiency via the composition of aggregate investment. The large
decline in the price of capital goods in period t = 1 strongly raises the aggregate credit
supply in period t = 0. Meanwhile, given θH close to zero, FDI inflows does not raise
the aggregate credit demand very much. Overall, the neoclassical effect and the credit-
supply effect dominate the credit-demand effect so that the loan rate falls in period t = 0.
Conversely, for θH close to θ¯, the credit-demand effect dominates so that the loan rate
rises. Given θH = θ¯
2
and θF = θ¯, the loan rate rises in period t = 0.
Consider the world as a whole. FDI flows affect the world output in period t = 1
via three effects. First, FDI inflows reduce the household project investment in country
H, which generates efficiency gains. Second, FDI outflows raise the household project
investment in country F, which generates efficiency losses. Third, given the concave
aggregate production on the country level, if capital flows reduce (widen) the cross-country
output gap, the world output would be higher (lower) than under international financial
autarky, according to the Jensen’s inequality. The net impact depends on the relative size
of the three effects, which depends on θH .
Before period t = 0, due to the positive household project investment iH,ht > i
F,h
t = 0,
production is less efficient in country H than in country F, as measured by the productivity
differential between the entrepreneurial and the household project, vH [R−G′(iH,h)] > 0 =
vF [R − G′(iF,h)]. Thus, in period t = 0, the efficiency gains in country H dominate the
efficiency losses in country F. Given θH = θ¯
2
and θF = θ¯, since FDI flows reduce the
cross-country output gap in period t = 1, the third effect is positive. Overall, the world
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output in period t = 1 is higher than before period t = 0.
We have analyzed the immediate impacts of FDI flows in period t = 0 and t = 1.
The world economy converges to the new steady state from period t = 1 on and capital
accumulation over time may change or even reverse the immediate impacts.
Consider country F first. The decline in aggregate output in period t = 1 reduces
the aggregate domestic investment, which then further reduces aggregate output in the
long run. The higher price of capital goods enhances the neoclassical effect, which keeps
the loan rate in the long run higher than before period t = 0. This way, due to capital
accumulation, the loan rate effect of FDI flows reverses from negative in the short run to
positive in the long run. Conversely, in country H, capital accumulation further reduces
the price of capital goods and the enhanced neoclassical effect keeps the loan rate in the
long run lower than before period t = 0.
Given θH = θ¯
2
and θF = θ¯, capital accumulation triggered by FDI flows further raises
(reduces) aggregate output in country H (F). The cross-country output gap widens from
period t = 2 on, but is still smaller than before period t = 0, implying that the third
effect on the world output is still positive but declines over time. Thus, the world output
declines from period t = 2 on but still higher than before period t = 0.
3.1.2 Long-Run Impacts of Free Mobility of FDI
Given θF = θ¯, figure 5 shows the percentage differences of variables in the steady state
under free mobility of FDI and under international financial autarky, with the horizontal
axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯). The vertical axes of the panels entitled “Capital Flows (Level)”
and “Country Output (Level)” show the levels of relevant variables. Y iIFA and Y
i
FDI
denote the steady-state values of aggregate output under international financial autarky
and under free mobility of FDI in country i ∈ {H,F}, respectively.
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Figure 5: Free mobility of FDI versus International Financial Autarky
Since FDI flows are essentially driven by the cross-country equity-rate differential
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under international financial autarky, the inverse hump-shaped pattern of FDI flows into
country H shown in the first panel of figure 5 follows the pattern of the cross-country
equity-rate differential shown in figure 3. Given θF = θ¯, if the financial sector in country
H is severely underdeveloped (θH close to zero), a marginal improvement in the financial
sector in country H promotes FDI inflows in the long run; otherwise, for θH close to θ¯, a
marginal improvement in the financial sector reduces FDI inflows in the long run.
FDI flows affect aggregate output via the size and the composition of the aggregate
domestic investment. Be specific, aggregate output rises (declines) in country H (F).
According to the panel “Country Output” of figure 5, the long-run patterns of aggregate
output in the two countries follow that of FDI flows. The long-run patterns of the loan
rate in the two countries are mainly driven by the neoclassical effect. The decline (rise)
in the price of capital goods in country H (F) leads to the decline (rise) in the loan rate.
Under international financial autarky, financial frictions in country H distort produc-
tion efficiency and aggregate output is lower than in country F. See the panel “Country
Output (Level)” of figure 5. For θH ∈ (0, θ¯
2
), the cross-country output gap is large under
international financial autarky. The small FDI flows result in the small rise (decline) in
aggregate output in country H (F), which reduces the cross-country output gap. In con-
trast, for θH ∈ ( θ¯
2
, θ¯) , the cross-country output gap is small under international financial
autarky and FDI flows widen the cross-country output gap by making aggregate output
in country H higher than in country F.
As mentioned in subsection 3.1.1, FDI flows affect the world output via the three
effects: the efficiency gains from resource reallocation in country H, the efficiency losses
from resource reallocation in country F, and the efficiency losses (gains) from capital
flows which widen (narrow) the cross-country output gap. The first and second effects
are on the country level, while the third effect is on the cross-country level. Consider
the case of θH close to θ¯. According to the upper-right panel of figure 5, FDI flows
widen the cross-country output gap and the third effect is thus negative. Given the small
cross-country productivity differential under international financial autarky, the first effect
slightly dominate the second effect so that the net efficiency effect on the country level is
slightly positive. Overall, the third effect dominates and the world output is lower than
under international financial autarky. Consider the case of θH close to zero. Since FDI
flows narrow the cross-country output gap, the third effect is positive. Given the tight
borrowing constraints in country H, the first effect is small and dominated by the second
effect. Thus, the net efficiency effect on the country level is negative and dominates the
third effect. Overall, the world output is lower. Consider the case of θH close to θ¯
2
= 0.4.
FDI flows do not affect the cross-country output gap very much and the third effect is
negligible. The large FDI flows create large efficiency gains in country H. Thus, the first
effect dominates and the world output is higher. This way, FDI flows may necessarily
generate the world output gains, depending on θH .
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3.2 Free Mobility of Financial Capital
The analysis for free mobility of financial capital follows that for free mobility of FDI.
Here, we summarize the main results and leave the detailed analysis in appendix B.
The cross-country loan-rate differential under international financial autarky drives
financial capital flows from period t = 0 on. Be specific, financial capital flows “uphill”
from country H to country F, which widens the cross-country output gap. The cross-
border loan rate equalization implies that the loan rate rises (declines) in country H (F).
Financial capital mobility affects the equity rate via three channels, i.e., the neo-
classical effect, the spread, and the debt-equity ratio. In country F, the equity rate is
determined mainly by the neoclassical effect. Thus, the decline in the price of capital
goods keeps the equity rate in country F lower. While, the net impact on the equity
rate in country H depends on θH . For θH close to zero, the tight borrowing constraints
imply that the equity rate depends mainly on the neoclassical effect. The rise in the
price of capital goods keep the equity rate in country H higher. For θH close to θ¯, the
equity rate depends mainly on the debt-equity ratio. Financial capital outflows reduces
the debt-equity ratio and the equity rate declines in country H.
As mentioned in subsection 3.1.1, capital flows affect the world output via three ef-
fects. Since financial capital flows widen the cross-country output gap, the third effect
is negative. For θH close to zero, the household project investment in country H is large
before period t = 0 and financial capital flows significantly reduce the household invest-
ment. Thus, the first effect dominates and the world output is higher. For θH close to θ¯,
the household project investment in country H is small before period t = 0 and so is the
first effect. Overall, the third effect dominates and the world output is lower.
3.3 Full Capital Mobility
Given that the borrowing constraints are binding in country i, the equilibrium conditions
under full capital mobility are almost same as under free mobility of FDI except for a few
conditions. In equilibrium, the cross-border flows of financial capital sum up to zero; the
loan rate is equal across the border; the credit-market-clearing condition, i.e., equation
(16), is reformulated as equation (20),
ΥHt + Υ
F
t = 0, and r
H
t = r
F
t , (19)
(λit − 1)(ηwit − Ωit) = (1− η)(wit − ii,ht )−Υit. (20)
In the following, we analyze the short-run and long-run impacts of full capital mobility
in two scenarios. In subsection 3.3.1, we assume that the world economy is in the steady
state under international financial autarky until full capital mobility is allowed from period
t = 0 on. In subsection 3.3.2, we assume that the world economy is in the steady state
under free mobility of FDI until full capital mobility is allowed from period t = 0 on.
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3.3.1 From International Financial Autarky to Full Capital Mobility
Given θF = θ¯ and θH = θ¯
2
, figure 6 shows the impulse responses of variables in terms
of the percentage deviations from their steady-state levels under international financial
autarky, with the horizontal axis denoting the time periods. The vertical axes of pan-
els entitled “Capital Flows (Level)” and “Country Output (Level)” denote the levels of
relevant variables.
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Figure 6: From International Financial Autarky to Full Capital Mobility
Before period t = 0, the loan rate is higher while the equity rate is lower in country
H than in country F. In period t = 0, financial capital flows from country H to country
F while FDI flows in the opposite direction. As a result, the loan rate rises in country H
and declines in country F, while the equity rate changes in the opposite way.
As mentioned in subsection 3.1.1, the immediate impact of full capital mobility on
the world output in period t = 1 depends on three effects. Before period t = 0, domestic
financial frictions distort production efficiency in country H so that aggregate output is
lower than in country F. Being more financially developed, country F has a larger credit
market than country H. Thus, capital in the net term flows “uphill” from country H to
country F in period t = 0, ΥHt + Ω
H
t > 0, which widens the cross-country output gap
and the efficiency effect on the cross-country level is thus negative. Consider country
H. In period t = 0, financial capital outflows reduce the domestic credit supply and
FDI inflows increase the domestic credit demand. Thus, households reduce their project
investment, which improves production efficiency. Consider country F. In period t = 0,
financial capital inflows and FDI outflows induce households to start investing in their
own projects, which worsens production efficiency. Since production is less efficient in
country H than in country F under international financial autarky, the efficiency gains
in country H dominate the efficiency losses in country F and the net efficiency effect on
the country level is positive. Furthermore, the net efficiency gains on the country level
depend on gross capital flows, while the efficiency losses on the cross-country level depends
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on net capital flows. Since two-way capital flows imply large gross flows and small net
flows, the net efficiency gains on the country level dominates the efficiency losses on the
cross-country level and the world output is thus higher in period t = 1.
From period t = 1 on, due to capital accumulation, the world economy converges to
its new steady state. In the long run, aggregate output is higher in country F than in
country H; financial capital flows “uphill” while FDI flows “downhill”; net capital flows
“uphill”; the world output is higher than before period t = 0.
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Figure 7: Full Capital Mobility versus International Financial Autarky
We then analyze the long-run impacts of full capital mobility. Given θF = θ¯, figure 7
shows the percentage differences of variables in the steady state under full capital mobility
and under international financial autarky, with the horizontal axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯).
The variables with subscripts FDI, FCF, and FCM refer to their steady-state values under
free mobility of FDI, free mobility of financial capital, and full capital mobility.
According to the upper-left panel of figure 7, financial capital and FDI flow in the
opposite direction. Furthermore, FDI and financial capital flows are complements in the
sense that FDI (financial capital) flows in the steady state are larger under full capital
mobility than under free mobility of FDI (financial capital). In other words, given free
mobility of FDI, allowing additionally free mobility of financial capital raises FDI flows.
According to the upper-right panel, despite of net capital outflows, NCFHFCM ≡ ΥH +
ΩH > 0, country H has a negative net investment income, NNIHFCM ≡ (r∗− 1)ΥH + (Γ∗−
1)ΩH < 0. Intuitively, since country F is more financially developed, its financial capital
inflows exceeds its FDI outflows. According to the upper-middle panel, the world equity
rate is higher than the world loan rate so that country F gets the higher return on its
foreign assets than it pays on its foreign debts. Thus, as a net debtor, country F receives
a positive net investment return. In other words, country F “exports” its financial service
via two-way capital flows and receives the positive rewards accordingly.
As mentioned above, full capital mobility affects the world output via three effects.
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As shown in the bottom-left panel of figure 7, net capital flows from country H to country
F widen the cross-country output gap and the third effect is thus negative. Meanwhile,
both financial capital and FDI flows trigger resource reallocation in both countries. Given
production in country H is less efficient than in country F, the net efficiency effect on the
country level is positive. Under full capital mobility, the two-way capital flows imply large
gross flows and small net flows, which strengthens the net efficiency effect on the country
level and weakens the efficiency losses on the cross-country level, respectively. Thus, the
world output is higher in the long run. As shown in the bottom-right panel, the world
output gains decline in θH . Intuitively, the world output gains fall as the cross-country
differences in financial development (θF − θH) decreases.
3.3.2 From Free Mobility of FDI to Full Capital Mobility
Developing countries generally encourage free mobility of FDI as it helps increase aggre-
gate output and the labor income, as shown in subsection 3.1. In this subsection, we
discuss how additionally allowing financial capital flows may affect aggregate production
in the developing country, with free mobility of FDI already in place.
Given θF = θ¯ and θH = θ¯
2
, figure 8 shows the impulse responses of variables in terms of
the percentage deviations from their steady-state levels under free mobility of FDI, with
the horizontal axis denoting the time periods. The vertical axes of panels entitled “Capital
Flows (Level)” and “Country Output (Level)” denote the levels of relevant variables.
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Figure 8: From Free Mobility of FDI to Full Capital Mobility
According to Subsection 3.1.2, free mobility of FDI widens the cross-country loan-rate
differential so that the loan rate is higher in country F than in country H before period
t = 0. Thus, in period t = 0, financial capital flows from country H to country F, which
raises (reduces) the loan rate in country H (F).
The immediate impact on the equity rate depends on three factors, the neoclassical
effect, the debt-equity ratio, and the spread. Consider country H. Financial capital out-
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flows reduce the aggregate output of capital goods and the rise in the price of capital
goods in period t = 1 tends to increase the equity rate in period t = 0 via the neoclassical
effect. Meanwhile, financial capital outflows reduce the aggregate credit supply and raise
the loan rate, which tends to reduce the equity rate in period t = 0 via the declines in
the debt-equity ratio and the spread. The net impact on the equity rate depends on θH .
For θH close to zero, the tight borrowing constraints imply that the equity rate depends
mainly on the neoclassical effect. In period t = 0, the cross-country loan-rate differential
is large and so are financial capital outflows. Thus, the neoclassical effect dominates and
the equity rate rises in period t = 0. For θH close to θ¯, the loose borrowing constraints
imply that the equity rate depends mainly on the debt-equity ratio. In period t = 0,
financial capital outflows reduce the aggregate credit supply and the decline in the debt-
equity ratio dominates. Thus, the equity rate declines in period t = 0. Given θH = θ¯
2
and
θF = θ¯, the equity rate declines in period t = 0 and so do FDI inflows.
According to Subsection 3.1.2, aggregate output is higher in country H than in country
F until period t = 0. From period t = 0 on, financial capital flows reverse the aggregate
output pattern so that aggregate output in country H is lower than in country F.
Similar as in subsection 3.3.1, financial capital flows and FDI involve not only the
cross-border resource reallocation but also trigger the within-border resource reallocation.
The two-way capital flows imply large gross flows and small net flows, which strengthens
the net efficiency effect on the country level and weakens the efficiency losses on the
cross-country level. Thus, the world output is higher in period t = 1. Due to capital
accumulation, the world output rises over time.
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Figure 9: Full Capital Mobility versus Free mobility of FDI
We then analyze the long-run impacts of full capital mobility. Given θF = θ¯, figure 9
shows the percentage differences of variables in the steady state under full capital mobility
and under free mobility of FDI, with the horizontal axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯).
The loan rate is higher in country F than in country H under free mobility of FDI
before period t = 0. Full capital mobility equalizes the loan rate across the border so that
the steady-state loan rate rises (declines) in country H (F). Similar as in the short-run
analysis, the long-run pattern of the equity rate depends on θH . For θH close to zero, the
neoclassical effect dominates and the equity rate is higher in the long run; for θH close to
θ¯, the debt-equity ratio dominates and the equity rate is lower in the long run.
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As mentioned above, full capital mobility affects the world output via three effects.
As shown in the left-bottom panel of figure 9, for θH close to θ¯ (0), full capital mobility
reduces (widens) the cross-country output gap and the third effect is positive (negative).
The third effect on the world output depends on net capital flows. Both financial capital
and FDI flows affect production efficiency on the country level and the efficiency gains
depend on gross capital flows. Under full capital mobility, the net efficiency gains on the
country level dominates and the world output is higher.
3.4 Capital Flows between Developing and Developed Countries
Besides 0 ≤ θH < θF = θ¯, we assume in this subsection that country F is in the steady
state, KF0 = K
F
IFA, while country H is below the steady state, 0 < K
H
0 < K
H
IFA, before
capital mobility is allowed in period t = 0. We analyze how capital mobility affects the
convergence process of a developing country (country H).
3.4.1 Free Mobility of FDI
Given θF = θ¯, figure 10 shows two threshold values, KHIFA and K
H
FDI , with the horizontal
axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯) and the vertical axis denoting the period-0 capital-labor ratio.
0
 θH  θU
 KHIFA
 KHFDI
 KH0
Figure 10: Free Mobility of FDI
Let us define a counterfactual case where the world economy is still under international
financial autarky in period t = 0. It helps uncover the cross-country equity-rate differential
that drives FDI flows in period t = 0 in the actual case. Consider the counterfactual case.
Compare with the equity rate in country F, ΓFIFA = ρ, the equity rate in country H is
positively affected by KH0 < K
F
0 via the neoclassical effect and by θ
H < θF = θ¯ via
the leverage effect. Thus, in period t = 0, the equity rate in country H is higher than in
country F. In the actual case, FDI flows “downhill”, which speeds up capital accumulation
in country H. Eventually, country H converges to a steady state with the capital-labor
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ratio KHFDI > K
H
IFA. Since the marginal return on investment is higher in country H than
in country F, “downhill” FDI flows raise the world output in period t = 1.
3.4.2 Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Given θF = θ¯, the thin solid line, the thick solid line, the dash-dotted line, and the dashed
line in figure 11 show four threshold values, KHIFA, K
H
FCF , Kˆ
H
0 , and K˜
H
0 , respectively, with
the horizontal axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯) and the vertical axis denoting the period-0 capital-
labor ratio in country H.
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Figure 11: Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Consider the counterfactual case. Compared with the loan rate in country F, rFIFA = ρ,
the loan rate in country H is affected positively by KH0 < K
F
0 via the neoclassical effect
and negatively by θH < θF via the credit-demand effect. Thus, given θH , there exists a
threshold value K˜H0 < K
H
IFA. For K
H
0 ∈ (0, K˜H0 ), the neoclassical effect dominates so that
the loan rate in country H and period t = 0 is higher than in country F. In the actual
case, financial capital flows “downhill” from country F to country H in period t = 0.
Since the marginal return on investment is larger in country H than in country F, the
“downhill” capital flows increase the world output. In figure 11, D-G refers to the region
with “Downhill” capital flows and the world output Gains.
For KH0 ∈ (K˜H0 , KHIFA), financial capital flows “uphill” in period t = 0, which widens
the cross-country output gap and tends to reduce the world output. Meanwhile, financial
capital outflows reduce the household project investment in country H and generate the
efficiency gains. For θH close θ¯, production inefficiency in country H and period t = 0 is
minor in the counterfactual case. In the actual case, the efficiency losses from “uphill”
capital flows dominate and the world output in period t = 0 is lower.
For KH0 ∈ (K˜H0 , KHIFA) and θH close to 0, production inefficiency in country H and
period t = 0 is severe in the counterfactual case. In the actual case, financial capital flows
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may generate larger efficiency gains via resource reallocation in country H than efficiency
losses due to the rise in the cross-country output gap. Thus, the world output in period
t = 0 may be higher than under international financial autarky. There exists a threshold
value KˆH0 ∈ (K˜H0 , KHIFA) as a function of θH . Given θH , for KH0 ∈ (KˆH0 , KHIFA), the cross-
country loan-rate differential in period t = 0 is large in the counterfactual case. In the
actual case, the efficiency gains in country H dominate and the world output in period
t = 1 is higher. Conversely, for KH0 ∈ (K˜H0 , KˆH0 ), the efficiency losses dominate and the
world output in period t = 1 is lower. In figure 11, U-G and U-L refer to the regions
with “Uphill” financial capital flows and the world output Gains, and “Uphill” financial
capital flows and the world output Losses, respectively.
For a developing country, the capital-labor ratio is very low at its early stage of eco-
nomic growth. The loan rate under international financial autarky may be higher than
the world loan rate. Under free mobility of financial capital, capital inflows speed up its
capital accumulation. However, as long as its capital-labor ratio exceeds a threshold value
K˜H0 so that its loan rate under international financial autarky falls below the world loan
rate, financial capital mobility leads to financial capital outflows, which hampers the ag-
gregate domestic investment. Eventually, the country converges to a steady state with the
capital-labor ratio lower than that under international financial autarky, KHFCF < K
H
IFA.
Thus, the patterns of financial capital flows may reverse along its convergence process.
Furthermore, financial capital mobility has opposite effects on aggregate production at
the different stages of its convergence process.
3.4.3 Full Capital Mobility
Given θF = θ¯, the thin solid line, the thick solid line, the dash-dotted line, and the dashed
line in figure 12 show four threshold values, KHIFA, K
H
FCM , Kˆ
H
0 , and K˜
H
0 , respectively,
with the horizontal axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯) and the vertical axis denoting the period-0
capital-labor ratio.
Besides the first counterfactual case defined in subsection 3.4.1, we define the second
counterfactual case with free mobility of FDI allowed from period t = 0. In the second
counterfactual case, due to FDI flows, the loan rate in period t = 0 is higher (lower) in
country H (F) than in the first counterfactual case. There exists a threshold value KˆH0
such that for KH0 = Kˆ
H
0 , the period-0 loan rate is same in two countries in the second
counterfactual case. Under full capital mobility, there are FDI flows but no financial
capital flows in period t = 0. For KH0 ∈ (0, KˆH0 ), due to the neoclassical effect, the
loan rate in country H and period t = 0 is higher than in country F in the second
counterfactual case. Thus, both financial capital and FDI flow “downhill”. Conversely,
for KH0 ∈ (KˆH0 , KIFA), financial capital flows “uphill” while FDI flows “downhill”.
Given θH , there exists another threshold value, K˜H0 > Kˆ
H
0 . For K
H
0 ∈ (KˆH0 , K˜H0 ),
“downhill” FDI flows dominate “uphill” financial capital flows and net capital flows are
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Figure 12: Full Capital Mobility
“downhill” in period t = 0. Conversely, for KH0 ∈ (K˜H0 , KIFA), net capital flows are
“uphill”. In figure 12, D-O, D-T, U-T refer to the regions where capital in the net term
flows “Downhill” (“Uphill”) and financial capital and FDI flow in One (Two) way(s).
Similar as in subsection 3.3, full capital mobility raises the world output in period t = 0.
Consider a developing country with the capital-labor ratio in region D-O when it starts
full capital mobility. Financial capital and FDI inflows speed up its capital accumulation
in the short run. As the capital-labor ratio moves into regions D-T and then U-T,
the direction of financial capital flows first reverses from “downhill” to “uphill”, and
then, financial capital outflows exceeds FDI inflows so that net capital flows reverse from
“downhill” to “uphill”. Eventually, the country converges to a new steady state with
the capital-labor ratio lower than under international financial autarky, KHFCM < KIFA.
This way, full capital mobility speeds up capital accumulation in the early stage of its
convergence process at the cost of lower steady-state aggregate output.
4 Conclusion
We develop a two-country overlapping generations model and show that the cross-country
difference in financial development can explain three recent empirical facts. In a less finan-
cially developed country, financial frictions create two distinct distortions on the interest
rates and production efficiency under international financial autarky. International capital
flows help ameliorate the two distortions.
International capital flows not only involve cross-country resource reallocation but also
trigger within-country resource reallocation. We distinguish two effects of capital flows
on the world output. First, due to the concave aggregate production function, capital
flows, which widen (reduce) the cross-country output gap, tend to reduce (raise) the
world output. Second, FDI and financial capital flows trigger the resource reallocation
from the less to the more productive projects both within and across the border, which
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improves production efficiency and tends to raise the world output. The second effect
depend on gross capital flows while the first effect depends on net capital flows. Under
full capital mobility, two-way capital flows result in large gross flows and small net flows,
which strengthens the second effect and weakens the first effect. Overall, full capital flows
generate the world output gains. However, if the mobility of either financial capital or FDI
is restricted, the world output may be lower than under international financial autarky.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Propositions 1
Proof. Let θ¯ denote the threshold value where capital goods are produced only by en-
trepreneurs, iht = 0, and their borrowing constraints are weakly binding. For θ = θ¯,
according to equation (4) and Assumption 1, rt = vt+1G
′(0) = vt+1R. The credit market
clearing condition (1 − η)wt = η(iet − wt) implies It = ηiet = wt. Given the per capita
investment and debt, iet =
wt
η
and zt = i
e
t − wt = (1−η)wtη , the (weakly) binding borrowing
constraint, rtzt = θ¯Rvt+1i
e
t , implies Rvt+1
(1−η)wt
η
= Rvt+1θ¯
wt
η
. Thus, θ¯ = (1− η).
For θ = θ¯, the loan rate is equal to the marginal return on the entrepreneurial project,
rt = vt+1G
′(0) = vt+1R = Γt, and so is the equity rate, according to equation (6). In
equilibrium, entrepreneurs still borrow to the limit; otherwise, some resources would be
invested in the household project and the loan rate would be lower than the equity rate.
For θ ∈ (θ¯, 1], entrepreneurs do not borrow to the limit, since the equity rate is equal
to the loan rate. In fact, the project investment of individual entrepreneur becomes
indeterminant. Due to the linearity of the preferences, the entrepreneurial projects, and
the borrowing constraints, it is the size of the aggregate entrepreneurial investment instead
of its distribution that matters for aggregate production. The credit market equilibrium
implies that the aggregate entrepreneurial borrowing is same as in the case of θ = θ¯ and
so is the economic allocation.
Proof of Propositions 2
Proof. Suppose that the borrowing constraints are strictly binding for θ ∈ [0, θ¯). Given
the aggregate labor income invested in period t, wt = ηi
e
t + (1− η)iht , and the equilibrium
loan rate rt = vt+1G
′(iht ), the borrowing constraints are reformulated as,
θ
[
η
(1− η)
wt
(wt − iht )
+ 1
]
=
G′(iht )
R
. (21)
Given the capital-labor ratio, the labor income wt is uniquely determined in period t.
Consider the two sides of equation (21) as two functions of iht . Graphically, the right-hand
side can be represented by a monotonically downward-sloping curve with an intercept of
G′(0)
R
= 1 on the vertical axis, while the left-hand side by a monotonically upward-sloping
curve with an intercept of θ
1−η on the vertical axis. Given θ ∈ [0, θ¯), the two curves must
intersect once and only once at iht > 0. The loan rate is smaller and the equity rate is larger
than the marginal return on the entrepreneurial project, rt = vt+1G
′(iht ) < vt+1R < Γt. It
confirms our conjecture that the borrowing constraints are binding for θ ∈ [0, θ¯).
According to equation (21), iht is a function of θ, given the capital-labor ratio and thus
the labor income. Take the first derivative of equation (21) with respect to θ,
G′(iht )
θR
=
[
G′′(iht )
R
− η
(1− η)
θwt
(wt − iht )2
]
diht
dθ
. (22)
30
According to Assumption 1, the concavity of the household project, G′′(iht ) < 0 < G
′(iht ),
implies
diht
dθ
< 0. The aggregate output of capital goods is Kt+1 = Rwt − Λt, where
Λt ≡ (1 − η)[Riht − G(iht )] measures the short-run efficiency losses due to the household
project investment. Given the labor income, financial development reduces the inefficient
investment in the household project,
diht
dθ
< 0, which reduces the short-run efficiency losses,
dΛt
diht
= (1− η)[R−G′(iht )] > 0. Using the wage dynamics, wt+1 =
(
Kt+1
ρ
)α
, we get
dwt+1
dθ
= (1− α)
(
Kt+1
ρ
)α−1
(1− η)[G′(iht )−R]
diht
dθ
> 0. (23)
Financial development improves production efficiency in period t and then raises aggregate
output as well as the labor income in period t+ 1. Thus, the phase diagram of wages for
θ ∈ [0, θ¯) is in parallel lower than for θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], as shown in figure 1.
Proof of Propositions 3
Proof. According to Proposition 1, for θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], capital goods are produced only by
entrepreneurs, iht = 0, and thus, the two interest rates are equal to the marginal return
on the entrepreneurial projects, rt = vt+1G
′(0) = vt+1R = Γt. Since capital goods are
produced by entrepreneurs only, Kt+1 = Rηi
e
t = Rwt, the social rate of return is also equal
to the marginal return of the entrepreneurial projects, Ψt =
Ct+1
It
= vt+1Kt+1
wt
= Rvt+1.
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, vt+1 =
αYt+1
Kt+1
=
(
Kt+1
ρ
)α−1
and wt = (1 −
α)Yt =
(
Kt
ρ
)α
. Together with Kt+1 = Rwt, we get Rvt+1 = R
αρ1−α
2
(Kt)
α(α−1).
Proof of Propositions 4
Proof. Proposition 2 shows that for θ ∈ [0, θ¯), production is inefficient, iht > 0. According
to Assumption 1 and equation (6), the loan rate is smaller than the marginal return of
the entrepreneurial project and the equity rate, rt = vt+1G
′(iht ) < vt+1R ≤ Γt.6
We prove rt < Ψt by contradiction. Suppose rt ≥ Ψt. Thus, vt+1R > vt+1G′(iht ) ≥ Ψt,
which implies vt+1Ri
e
t > Ψti
e
t and vt+1G(i
h
t ) = vt+1
∫ iht
s=0
G′(s)ds > Ψtiht , given Assump-
tion 1. By definition, the social rate of return is Ψt =
vt+1Kt+1
It
=
vt+1[Rηiet+(1−η)G(iht )]
ηie+(1−η)ih >
Ψtηiet+Ψt(1−η)iht
ηie+(1−η)ih = Ψt. The contradiction of Ψt > Ψt proves rt < Ψt. We can also prove
Rvt+1 > Ψt by contradiction. Thus, the loan rate is lower while the equity rate is higher
than the social rate of return, rt < Ψt < Rvt+1 ≤ Γt.
Proof of Propositions 5
Proof. According to Propositions 3 and 4, rt = Ψt for θ = θ¯ and rt < Ψt for θ ∈
[0, θ¯). Given the capital-labor ratio, financial development improves production efficiency,
∂Yt+1
∂θ
> 0. Given the predetermined labor income, wt and Ψt =
vt+1Kt+1
wt
= αYt+1
wt
, the social
6In the no-borrowing case of θ = 0, the debt-equity ratio is zero and thus, Γt = Rvt+1.
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rate of return increases with the level of financial development, ∂Ψt
∂θ
= α
wt
∂Yt+1
∂θ
> 0. Thus,
the loan rate has the highest value at θ = θ¯, rt|θ=θ¯ = Ψt|θ=θ¯ > Ψt|θ∈[0,θ¯) > rt|θ∈[0,θ¯).
Proof of Propositions 6
Proof. For θ ∈ (0, θ¯), the borrowing constraints are binding so that equation (21) defines
iht a function of wt. Take the derivative of equation (21) with respect to wt,
G′′(iht )
R
(wt − iht )2
wt
=
θη
(1− η)
(
1− 1
Zt
)
, where Zt ≡ ∂ ln i
h
t
∂ lnwt
. (24)
Given G′′(iht ) < 0, it is trivial to prove 0 < Zt < 1 by contradiction. Given 0 <
iht
wt
< 1
and 0 <
∂ ln iht
∂ lnwt
=
∂iht
∂wt
wt
iht
< 1, we get 0 <
∂iht
∂wt
<
iht
wt
< 1.
Proof of Propositions 7
Proof. According to Propositions 3 and 4, Γt = Rvt+1 for θ = θ¯ and Γt ≥ Rvt+1 for θ ∈
[0, θ¯). Given the capital-labor ratio, financial development improves production efficiency,
which leads to the decline in the price of capital goods, ∂vt+1
∂θ
< 0. Thus, the equity rate
has the lowest value at θ = θ¯, Γt|θ=θ¯ = Rvt+1|θ=θ¯ < Rvt+1|θ∈[0,θ¯) ≤ Γt|θ∈[0,θ¯).
B Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Given that the borrowing constraints are binding in both countries under free mobility
of financial capital, the equilibrium conditions are almost same as under international
financial autarky except for a few conditions. In equilibrium, the cross-border flows of
financial capital sum up to zero; the loan rate is equal across the border; the credit-
market-clearing condition, i.e., equation (10), is reformulated as equation (26),
ΥHt + Υ
F
t = 0, and r
H
t = r
F
t , (25)
(λit − 1)ηwit = (1− η)(wit − ii,ht )−Υit. (26)
In subsection B.1, we analyze the model dynamics with respect to free mobility of financial
capital from period t = 0 on, given θH = θ¯
2
and θF = θ¯. In subsection B.2, we analyze
the long-run impacts of free mobility of financial capital, given θH ∈ [0, θ¯) and θF = θ¯.
B.1 Dynamic Impacts of Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Figure 13 shows the impulse responses of variables in terms of the percentage deviations
from their steady-state values under international financial autarky, with the horizon-
tal axis denoting the time periods. The vertical axes of panels entitled “Capital Flows
(Level)” and “Country Output (Level)” show the levels of relevant variables.
The analysis is similar as in subsection 3.1.1. According to figure 3, the steady-state
loan rate is lower in country H than in country F under international financial autarky.
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Figure 13: From International Financial Autarky to Free Mobility of Financial Capital
From period t = 0 on, individuals born in country H lend abroad. The cross-country loan
rate equalization implies that the loan rate rises (declines) in country H (F).
Consider country F first. Financial capital inflows raise the aggregate domestic invest-
ment, while the decline in the loan rate induces households to lend less and start to invest
in their own projects. Thus, aggregate output in period t = 1 is affected positively via
the size and negatively via the composition of the aggregate domestic investment. Over-
all, the size effect dominates the composition effect and aggregate output rises in period
t = 1. Since financial capital inflows dominate the decline in the household lending, the
aggregate credit supply rises and so does the debt-equity ratio. According to equation
(14), the equity rate depends on the neoclassical effect, the spread, and the debt-equity
ratio. In period t = 0, the increase in the debt-equity ratio dominates and the equity rate
rises. Financial capital inflows trigger capital accumulation over time. Aggregate output
is higher in the long run than before period t = 0. The equity rate is mainly determined
by the neoclassical effect in the long run. The decline in the price of capital goods keeps
the equity rate lower in the long run than before period t = 0. This way, due to capital
accumulation, the equity rate effect of financial capital flows reverses from positive in the
short run to negative in the long run.
Consider country H. Financial capital outflows affect aggregate output in period t =
1 negatively via the size and positively via the composition of the aggregate domestic
investment. Overall, the size effect dominates and aggregate output declines in period
t = 1. The response of the equity rate depends on θH . For θH close to zero, the tight
credit constraints imply a small debt-equity ratio. Thus, the equity rate is determined
mainly by the neoclassical effect. Financial capital outflows reduce the aggregate domestic
investment in period t = 0 and the rise in the price of capital goods in period t = 1 keeps
the equity rate higher in period t = 0. In contrast, for θH close to θ¯, the debt-equity ratio
is large and the equity rate is thus determined mainly by the spread and the debt-equity
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ratio. Financial capital outflows reduce the spread and the debt-equity ratio. Thus, the
equity rate declines in period t = 0. Given θH = θ¯
2
, the equity rate declines in period
t = 0. Financial capital outflows trigger capital accumulation, which further reduces
aggregate output over time. Due to the neoclassical effect, the equity rate rises over time.
Given θH = θ¯
2
, the steady-state equity rate is lower than before period t = 0.
As mentioned in subsection 3.1.1, the immediate impact of financial capital flows on
the world output in period t = 1 depends on three effects. Financial capital flows widen
the cross-country output gap and the third effect is thus negative. For θH close to zero, the
borrowing constraint is very tight in country H and financial capital outflows significantly
reduce the household project investment. Given the loose borrowing constraint θF = θ¯,
financial capital inflows slightly raise the household project investment in country F.
Overall, the net efficiency effect on the country level is significantly positive and dominates
the third effect. Thus, the world output is higher in period t = 1. Conversely, for θH close
to θ¯, the small cross-country loan rate differential under international financial autarky
imply small financial capital flows. Overall, the net efficiency effect on the country level
is slightly positive and dominated by the third effect. Thus, the world output is lower
in period t = 1. Given θH = θ¯
2
, the world output rises in period t = 1. In the long
run, capital accumulation reinforces the efficiency losses on the cross-country level and
the world output is lower than before period t = 0.
B.2 Long-Run Impacts of Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Given θF = θ¯, figure 14 shows the percentage differences of variables in the steady state
under free mobility of financial capital and under international financial autarky, with
the horizontal axis denoting θH ∈ [0, θ¯). The vertical axes of the panels entitled “Capital
Flows (Level)” and “Country Output (Level)” show the levels of relevant variables.
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Figure 14: Free mobility of Financial Capital versus International Financial Autarky
Since financial capital flows are driven by the cross-country loan-rate differential under
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international financial autarky, the pattern of financial capital flows in the first panel of
figure 14 follows that of the cross-country loan-rate differential shown in figure 3.
Financial capital flows affect aggregate output via the size and the composition of the
aggregate domestic investment in the two countries. Panel “Country Output” of figure
14 shows that the patterns of aggregate output follow that of financial capital flows.
As mentioned in subsection 3.1.1, financial capital flows affect the world output via
three effects. Financial capital flows widen the cross-country output gap and the third
effect is thus negative. For θH close to zero, the productivity differential between the
entrepreneurial and the household project in country H is large and so is the first effect.
Overall, the net efficiency effect on the country level is significantly positive and dominates
the third effect. Thus, the world output is higher. Conversely, for θH close to θ¯, the small
productivity differential between the entrepreneurial and the household project in country
H implies that the first effect is small. Overall, the net efficiency effect on the country
level is small and dominated by the third effect. Thus, the world output is lower.
The long-run equity-rate pattern in country F is mainly driven by the neoclassical
effect. Financial capital inflows trigger capital accumulation and the further decline in the
price of capital goods keeps the equity rate in the long run lower than under international
financial autarky. The long-run equity-rate pattern in country H depends on θH . For θH
close to zero, the tight borrowing constraints imply that the equity rate depends mainly
on the neoclassical effect. Capital accumulation further raises the price of capital goods
and the equity rate in the long run is higher. For θH close to θ¯, the equity rate depends
mainly on the debt-equity ratio. Since financial capital outflows reduce the debt-equity
ratio, the equity rate in the long run is lower.
C Threshold Values under Capital Mobility
C.1 Free Mobility of FDI
For a detailed description of the direction and size of FDI over the complete parameter
constellations of θH and θF , figure 15 shows some threshold values, where the horizontal
and vertical axes denote θH ∈ [0, 1] and θF ∈ [0, 1], respectively.
Similarly as in subsection B.2, for the parameter combination in region A as well as
on the 45 degree line, the equity rate is same in the two countries under international
financial autarky and there is no FDI flow even if allowed, ΩH = ΩF = 0.
The curve splitting region B and E represents a set of threshold values θFDI,UF ∈ (θU , 1)
as a function of θH . In region B, the equity rate is equal to the loan rate and the borrowing
constraint is not binding in country F; the economic allocation is same as in the case of
θF = θ¯FFDI . In region E, the equity rate is higher than the loan rate and the borrowing
constraint is binding in country F. Similarly, the curve splitting regionB′ and E ′ represents
a set of threshold values θFDI,UH ∈ (θU , 1) as the function of θF ∈ [0, θU).
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Figure 15: Free Mobility of FDI: Threshold Values
The curve splitting region E and J represents a set of threshold values θFDI,0F as a
function of θH . Given θH and θF = θFDI,0F 6= θH , the equity rate is equal in the two
countries under international financial autarky, due to the hump-shaped pattern of the
equity rate. Thus, there is no FDI flow even if allowed. The intuition is explained in
subsection 2.5 and is straightforward from the third panel of figure 3. Similarly, the curve
splitting region E ′ and J ′ represents a set of threshold values θFDI,0H as a function of θ
F .
Note that θ∗ refers to the level of financial development relating to the highest equity rate
under international financial autarky.
Table 1: FDI Flows and Equity Premium in the Steady State
Region A B B′ E E ′ J J ′
ΩH 0 ΩH(θH) < 0 ΩH(θF ) > 0 (ΩH(θH), 0) (0,ΩH(θF )) + −
ΓH − r∗ 0 + 0 + + + +
ΓF − r∗ 0 0 + + + + +
Table 1 summarizes the steady-state FDI flows and the equity premium in the seven
regions, ΩF = −ΩH . ΩH(θi) implies that given the parameter combination in region B
and B′, FDI flows depends only on θi not on θm, where i,m ∈ {H,F} and i 6= m.
For a complete description of how free mobility of FDI affects the world output in the
steady state, figure 16 shows some threshold values, where the horizontal and vertical axes
denote θH ∈ [0, θ¯] and θF ∈ [0, θ¯], respectively. That is, we restrict our analysis over the
parameter set where the borrowing constraints are strictly binding under international
financial autarky. For the parameter values in region A, E, and F, the steady-state world
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output is lower under free mobility of FDI than under international financial autarky,
while the opposite is true for the parameter values in regions B and H.
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Figure 16: World Output Effect of Free Mobility of FDI
C.2 Free Mobility of Financial Capital
For a detailed description of the direction and size of financial capital flows over the
complete parameter constellations of θH and θF , figure 17 shows some threshold values,
where the horizontal and vertical axes denote θH ∈ [0, 1] and θF ∈ [0, 1], respectively.
If θH = θF , i.e., the parameter constellations on the 45 degree line, the loan rates are
same in the two countries under international financial autarky and there are no capital
flows even if allowed, ΥHt = Υ
F
t = 0. If θ
H > θU and θF > θU as in region A, the loan rate
is equal to the social rate of return in both countries according to Proposition 1. Again,
there are no international financial capital flows.
The curve splitting regions B and E represents the threshold value of θFC,UF ∈ (θU , 1)
as the function of θH . In region B, the equity rate is equal to the loan rate and the
borrowing constraint is not binding in country F, and the economic allocation is same as
in the case of θF = θ¯FFC . In region E, the equity rate is higher than the loan rate and the
borrowing constraint is binding in country F. Similarly, the curve splitting region B′ and
E ′ represents a set of threshold values θFC,UH ∈ (θU , 1) as the function of θF ∈ [0, θU).
Table 2 summarizes the steady-state financial capital flows and the equity premium
in the five regions, ΥF = −ΥH . ΥH(θi) implies that given the parameter combination in
region B and B′, financial capital flows depend only on θi not on θm, where i,m ∈ {H,F}.
The borrowing constraint is binding if the equity premium is positive.
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Figure 17: Free Mobility of Financial Capital: Threshold Values
Table 2: Financial Capital Flows and Equity Premium in the Steady State
Region A B B′ E E ′
ΥH 0 ΥH(θH) > 0 ΥH(θF ) < 0 (0,ΥH(θH)) (ΥH(θF ), 0)
ΓH − r∗ 0 + 0 + +
ΓF − r∗ 0 0 + + +
For a complete description of how free mobility of financial capital affects the world
output in the steady state, figure 18 shows some threshold values, where the horizontal
and vertical axes denote θH ∈ [0, θ¯] and θF ∈ [0, θ¯], respectively. For the parameter values
in region A, the steady-state world output is lower under free mobility of financial capital
than under international financial autarky, while the opposite is true for the parameter
values in region B.
C.3 Full Capital Mobility
For a detailed description of the direction and size of financial capital and FDI flows over
the complete parameter constellations of θH and θF , figure 19 shows some threshold values,
where the horizontal and vertical axes denote θH ∈ [0, 1] and θF ∈ [0, 1], respectively.
Similarly as in subsection B.2, for the parameter combination in region A as well as
on the 45 degree line, economic allocations are identical in the two countries and there is
no capital flows across the border, ΩH = ΩF = 0 and ΥH = ΥF = 0, even if allowed.
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Figure 18: World Output Effect of Free Mobility of Financial Capital
The curve splitting region B and E represents the relationship between θH and θF ,
θH + θF = 2(1− η). (27)
In region B, the equity rate is equal to the loan rate and the borrowing constraint is not
binding in both countries. In other words, economic allocation is identical and efficient
in both countries in the sense that capital goods are produced only by entrepreneurs. In
region E, the world equity rate is higher than the world loan rate and the borrowing
constraints are binding in both countries. Similarly, the curve splitting region B′ and E ′
also represents the relationship between θH and θF as specified in equations (27).
The curve splitting region E and J represents a set of threshold values θFDI,0F as a
function of θH . Given θH and θF = θFDI,0F 6= θH , the equity rate is equal in the two
countries under free mobility of financial capital and thus, there is no FDI flows even if
additionally allowed. The curve splitting region J and M represents a set of threshold
values θFC,0F as a function of θ
H . Given θH and θF = θFC,0F 6= θH , the loan rate is equal in
the two countries under free mobility of FDI and thus, there is no financial capital flows
even if additionally allowed. Similarly, the curve splitting region E ′ and J ′ (J ′ and M ′)
represents a set of threshold values θFDI,0H (θ
FC,0
H ) as a function of θ
F .
Table 3 the steady-state flows of financial capital and FDI as well as the equity pre-
mium in the nine regions, where ΥF = −ΥH and ΩF = −ΩH . ΥH(θi) and ΩH(θi) imply
that given the parameter combination in region B and B′, financial capital and FDI flows
depend only on θi not on θm, where i,m ∈ {H,F} and i 6= m.
For a complete description of how full capital mobility affects the world output in the
steady state, figure 20 shows some threshold values, where the horizontal and vertical
axes denote θH ∈ [0, θ¯] and θF ∈ [0, θ¯], respectively. For the parameter values in region A,
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Figure 19: Full Capital Mobility: Threshold Values
Table 3: Capital Flows and Equity Premium in the Steady State
Region A B B′ E E ′ J J ′ M M ′
ΥH 0 ΥH(θH) > 0 ΥH(θF ) < 0 + − + − − +
ΩH 0 ΩH(θH) < 0 ΩH(θF ) > 0 − + + − + −
ΓH − r∗ 0 + 0 + + + + + +
ΓF − r∗ 0 0 + + + + + + +
the steady-state world output is lower under full capital mobility than under international
financial autarky, while the opposite is true for the parameter values in region B.
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Figure 20: World Output Effect of Full Capital Mobility
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